would give them the volkstaat. I told him that I was a mere servant of
the ANC, subject to their authority and discipline; that if I acted
unilaterally on a principle of such fundamental importance, the
organisation would summarily dismiss me, rendering me useless to
the rightwing. He retorted quite firmly that if I did not accept his
demand their plan would be carried out. I said; so be it, and that was the
end of our discussion. That same day I telephoned former
President
Botha and briefed him on the general's decision. I requested the
former president to persuade the general to join the negotiations at the
World Trade Centre. A few days later the general pulled out of the rightwing
conspiracy and joined the negotiating parties. His
colleagues heavily vilified him for saving
South Africa from such a calamity.
Hartzenberg did not have any military capacity at all and
Terre'Blanche relied on a collection of undisciplined amateurs who
had no idea of what a war involved. On the eve of the elections,
bombs exploded especially in Johannesburg and killed about 20
innocent civilians. It was a matter for police action and the culprits
were arrested and convicted.
I never enquired whether the former President did act on my request.
But in the 1994 general elections the general was rewarded for his
wisdom and his foresight when he polled 37 percent of the votes,
whereas a former section of the liberation movement polled less than
2 percent.
The failure of the rightwing to call a referendum and to answer the
question of who was an Afrikaner relieved the ANC of any obligation
to review the demand of a volkstaat.
Political analysts observed at the time that the general had opted for a
course of action, which enormously enhanced his esteem. This was
later reinforced by his contribution inside and outside parliament,
which was always balanced and full of integrity even when we
disagreed with such comments, especially when he continued to harp
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