advocated the view that these dummy institutions could be wrecked from within or used for the purpose of putting forth oru views did not mean what they said (presumably that they wanted to accept apartheid as the Bantustans leaders have done for example). They also used the astonishing argument that the Bolshevik Party in Russia regarded they boycott not as a question of tactics but as one of principle. They argued that now that the ANC had decided on the waging of an armed struggle, participation in these institutions, no matter for what purpose, had become unimportant and would serve as a diversion from the armed struggle. Finally they pointed out that the whole question of the boycott was fully discussed and settled in Lobatsi in 1962 and there was no need to re open it now. The debate started in 1969. The opposing point of view was that we should draw a clear distinction between principle and tactics. The former they pointed out was the fundamental line which guided all our actions and constituted the basic foundationn on which our organisations were built. In this particular case principle meant the unequivacal rejection of all forms of racial discrimination, the establishment of a government based on the will of all its people and resistance to all attempts to split up
South Africa into several independent areas. Like all foundations we could not tamper with it without endangering the whole structure. Tactics on the other hand, it was further argued were the means used to achieve our aims and depended on the concrete conditions. They changed with the ebb and flow of the struggle and should be used or abandoned as circumstances demanded. If to use a particular tactic would advance the cause then we should use it by all means and have no hesitation whatsoever in reviewing or replacing any particular method which no longer accords with these conditions. Equally important, if the employment of a particular tactic would retard our work then we should avoid it. It was urged