supremacy. This was not due to their consent. I added that we had a
just cause, numbers and the support of the international community.
They had none of these. I appealed to them to stop their plans and to
join the negotiations at the World Trade Centre. I spent some time
persuading them, but they were adamant and I could not move them at all.
Finally when I was about to give up, the General softened a bit and
said he could not approach his people with empty hands, at such an
advanced stage of their preparations.
Up to that moment I had insisted that as long as I was president of the
ANC , there would never be a Volkstaat in this country. A Volkstaat was s separate autonomous area for the Afrikaner. But now faced
with such a formidable challenge, I decided to retreat but in such a
way that they would find it far from easy to realise their demand.
I informed them that I would approach my organisation and ask them
to review our attitude on the Volkstaat on three conditions. The two of
them plus Terre'Blanche claimed that they represented the Afrikaners
who wanted a Volkstaat. On the other hand, President
De Klerk insisted that
only he represented the majority of Afrikaners, all of whom rejected
that demand.
The first condition therefore was that Afrikaners should have a
referendum to determine whether or not they wanted a Volkstaat.
Second, the result of the referendum would not necessarily bind the
ANC, but would be an important factor to take into account when
considering their demand. Finally they should answer the question: who
was an Afrikaner: was it a white person who spoke Afrikaans? Or was
it any person black — that is African, Coloured or Indian- who
spoke the language?
On compliance with these conditions, I would then report to my
organisation, leaving it to its members to review the matter as they
deemed fit. The General was satisfied that I had given him something
to present to his force, but Hartzenberg sharply differed and insisted
that I should there and then make an unequivocal undertaking that I
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