The Scuttling of the German Fleet 1919

Admiral Franz Ritter von Hipper, commander of the German fleet, refused to hand his ships over to Beatty, and delegated this task to Rear Admiral Ludwig von Reuter.

On 19 November the fleet of German warships led by von Reuter in his flagship, the battleship Friedrich der Grösse, left Germany to rendezvous with Beatty’s ships in the North Sea.

At the rendezvous the ships formed up as required and the joint convoy of 191 Allied and 70 German vessels that sailed into the Firth of Forth, Scotland, on 21 November 1918 was the largest fleet of warships ever assembled.

Once all the German ships had dropped anchor, Beatty gave the signal that the German flag was to be hauled down at sunset and not to be raised again without permission - a controversial move given the ships remained the property of Germany during internment.

Once checks that disarmament had been carried out had been completed, the German ships sailed under heavy Allied escort between 25 – 27 November for internment at the massive natural harbour at Scapa Flow in the Orkney Islands.

Three more ships would join them a short time after, and the 74th and final ship to arrive was the flagship of the High Seas Fleet, the dreadnought battleship Baden in January 1919, fulfilling the 74 ships required according to the terms of the internment.

For Rear Admiral von Reuter, command of his fleet was a difficult task from the outset.

Many among his crews had experienced long periods of inactivity since the Battle of Jutland in 1916, and had been laid up in port on board the ships subsisting on limited rations caused by blockades.

With the end of the war in sight, in October 1918 Grand Admiral Reinhardt Scheer planned an unsanctioned operation to send his fleet to inflict as much damage to the Royal Navy as possible, arguing: ‘There can be no future for a fleet fettered by a dishonourable peace.’

In other words, because Germany had not been defeated militarily, either on land or at sea, the navy should attempt a final attack to preserve its honour.

However it was also hoped a successful mission may have changed the military position to prevent surrender entirely, or else ensure more favourable Armistice terms.

For German sailors however, this was a suicide mission and one which would act only to extend the war, and they refused to follow orders to prepare for sea.

Protest and mutiny among sailors and industrial workers followed: a symptom of the broader problems the war and associated hardships had caused in Germany and elsewhere towards the end of the First World War.

This escalated into widespread revolt which resulted in the Socialists declaring Germany a republic on 9 November, followed by the exile and abdication of Kaiser Wilhelm II.

It comes as no surprise therefore, that von Reuter’s already unenviable task of surrendering the fleet and commanding such despondent, unpredictable and in some cases, revolutionary crews was made more difficult when his ships were sent to Scapa Flow for internment (a port which was not neutral as originally agreed, but also in a very remote location).

Once at Scapa Flow most of von Reuter’s 20,000 men were gradually sent back to Germany, leaving a small number aboard the ships as caretaker crews.

Those who remained now found themselves indeterminately stranded aboard their ships with lack of supplies and no entertainment, which resulted in poor discipline and appalling living conditions.

A particularly troublesome group aboard von Reuter’s flagship became so unmanageable that they caused him to seek permission from the British to make his flagship the cruiser Emden instead.

With no fresh meat supplies, and being forbidden to change ships or go ashore, the sailors sought their own recreation and food supplies.

Fishing was an ideal way to pass the time and supplement their diets, and on at least one German destroyer, the crew built a spring-loaded gun with which to kill seagulls to eat.

With the Paris Peace Conference discussions ongoing and the Treaty of Versailles delayed until the end of June 1919, the Allies remained divided over the fate of the ships.

Most wanted a share for their navies, but Britain wanted the ships to be scrapped to prevent other nations from gaining naval superiority.

By May the ultimate fate of the German fleet was still to be decided. However the treaty did call for the surrender of the interned ships by 21 June.

On discovering this news, von Reuter planned to scuttle his fleet as he’d been ordered to in the event the ships were to be seized by the Allies.

Unknown to von Reuter, the deadline was subsequently extended to 23 June and in anticipation of scuttling, Rear Admiral Sydney Fremantle, commander of the 1st Battle Squadron at Scapa Flow guarding the German ships, had planned to seize them on 23 June on his return from seagoing exercises.

France and other Allied nations were furious at the scuttling because they wanted a share of the ships.

Britain joined in the condemnation. However there were some, including Admiral Wemyss, the man who had suggested the internment in the first place, who considered it a relief, arguing: ‘It disposes, once and for all, the thorny question of the redistribution of these ships.’

Salvage operations began in 1919 to remove the scuttled ships, which had prevented the use of piers and fishing stations, and were a hazard to shipping.

In the years that followed, most of the ships were purchased from the Admiralty to be raised and scrapped by various private companies, the most prolific being Ernest Cox of Cox and Danks Ltd., who purchased 28 ships and a floating dock with which to raise them. This dock had been seized from Germany as part of reparations for the scuttling and enabled Cox to raise 26 destroyers and eventually, the battlecruiser Hindenburg in 1930.