Operation Bodyguard

Uncover the Deception that saved D-Day

Tehran Conference (1943-12-01) by Archive PhotosGetty Images

The problem: To Liberate Nazi-controlled Europe

In late 1943, Allied leaders met to agree a massive counter-offensive against the Nazis in Europe. As Churchill realised, successfully deceiving the enemy about their plans would be crucial.
 
"In wartime, truth is so precious that she should always be attended by a bodyguard of lies."

Notes on Operation FORTITUDE Notes on Operation FORTITUDE (20th Century) by The collection of Sir Basil Liddell Hart (1895-1970)King's College London Archives

OPERATION BODYGUARD

In London, a team of writers including spy novelist Dennis Wheatley began work on the boldest deception of the war.

Using a network of double-agents, a web of misinformation was spun out to German intelligence in a year-long exchange of thousands of letters and radio messages.  

Aerial photograph of Normandy (1944) by The collection of General Sir Miles Dempsey (1896-1969)King's College London Archives

By misleading the enemy about the Allies’ strategy, the aim of the deception plan was to persuade Germany to divert as many resources as possible away from the beaches where the Allies planned to launch their assault.

Germany, 1936, A portrait of Adolf Hitler on his 47th birthday.Yad Vashem

As decrypted communications from Berlin revealed,

Hitler was already inclined to believe that the Allies would attack at Calais. The crossing was easiest there, and Calais had port infrastructure which could receive incoming warships.

Intensive RAF bombing raids on the Pas-de-Calais area helped to reinforce his belief.

Fortitude - Radio Counter-Measures Fortitude - Radio Counter-Measures (20th Century) by The collection of Sir Basil Liddell Hart (1895-1970)King's College London Archives

Meanwhile, a variety of other deceptive measures helped to reinforce the illusion that Calais was the primary target.

Landing Craft (1944-06-06) by KeystoneGetty Images

The Allies' real targets were 200 miles further south.

Thousands of beach landing craft were manufactured in secret to be launched on D-day.

Meanwhile, hundreds of other parts were prepared, ready to be assembled into two huge floating harbours on the Normandy coast.

The story of the Fourth Army The story of the Fourth Army (1966) by The collection of Col Roderick Macleod (1891-1984)King's College London Archives

The fictional Fourth Army

In Scotland, an entire fictional army was created with fake wireless traffic and double-agents’ reports suggesting that an invasion of Norway was imminent.

The aim was to pin down nine German divisions there, which might otherwise have been sent to defend the French coast.

Image from Dutch language booklet, 'The British Army of now' (1945) by The collection of Edwin Embleton (1907-2000)King's College London Archives

Double-agent Juan Pujol Garcia, codenamed GARBO

As Allied forces set off for France, MI5’s double-agent GARBO urgently warned the enemy – making sure his information would arrive too late to be useful.

For months, he had fed German officers a stream of false intelligence designed to divert resources away from the invasion.

Allied soldiers land on French coast, from 'The British Army of now' (1945) by The collection of Edwin Embleton (1907-2000)King's College London Archives

As the first Allied troops pushed ashore and established themselves in Normandy, it was clear that German intelligence had been successfully deceived.

Photograph showing Beach landing in Normandy (1944) by The collection of Louis Wilson (1884-1973)King's College London Archives

Message from German Intelligence Officer Karl Kühlenthal

7 June, 1944
I wish to stress in the clearest terms that your work over the last few weeks has made it possible for our Command to be completely forewarned and prepared... I beg of you to continue with us in the supreme and decisive hours of the struggle for the future of Europe.

Extract from the telephone log of 7 German Army HQ (1944) by The collection of Sir Basil Liddell Hart (1895-1970)King's College London Archives

Intercepted telephone conversations revealed that German commanders knew coastal defences in Normandy were critically weak: Rommel  had ordered too many resources north to defend the V1 rocket sites in Calais.


After the invasion, captured documents confirmed their fears.

Maps showing Rommel's intended defences for Normandy, compared to actual defences in place on D-Day. (1944) by The collection of Sir Basil Liddell Hart (1895-1970)King's College London Archives

Weakened Defences

Maps showing Rommel’s original plan for the defence of Normandy (left) versus reduced forces in place on D-Day (right).

Transcript of a narrative recorded by Chester Wilmot, as BBC war correspondent with 6 Airborne Div, in a glider bound for France on 6 Jun 1944. Transcript of a narrative recorded by Chester Wilmot, as BBC war correspondent with 6 Airborne Div, in a glider bound for France on 6 Jun 1944. (1944) by The collection of Chester Wilmot (1911-1954)King's College London Archives

Before the day was out, the BBC dispatched one of their own star writers, Chester Wilmot, to report on the progress of the invasion from the air.

LIFE Photo Collection

Thanks to the deception planners and writers who worked on Operation Bodyguard, the Allies encountered far less resistance than they would otherwise have done on D-Day, successfully gaining a foothold in occupied France.

Credits: Story

Writers in British Intelligence: The Secret State and the Public Sphere
Principal Investigator: Professor Jago Morrison, Brunel University London
Acknowledgement: This research was supported by the Arts & Humanities Research Council (Grant AH/V001000/1)

Credits: All media
The story featured may in some cases have been created by an independent third party and may not always represent the views of the institutions, listed below, who have supplied the content.
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